Stories

True British Black Metal

Wojna (pronounced ?voyna?) was formed in early 2007 by vocalist, drummer, lyricist and composer Shadow. He was immediately joined by experienced musician, bassist/guitarist Dagon. We began writing and recording material in Redleaf Studios, home to the small extreme metal recording label, Redleaf Records, which has also released albums by E.N.D? and Cruciform.

Within a month of the band's formation, Wojna released its first recording, an EP entitled ?Crucifixion of the Good Reverend? which was distributed locally.

In January 2008 a demo album, ?Left Hand Path?, was released in order to get some feedback on our music from Black Metal fans in the South East. The album was distributed and sold more widely and the feedback was very positive.

We released our first full-length album entitled ?The Long Awaited Silence? in October 2008. It has been distributed nationally and is available in over 20 independent music shops and through several on-line distros.

Shadow and Dagon are the only full-time members of the band. The live line-up has undergone a few changes but has settled down to a regular team of musicians. For live performances Shadow sings and Dagon plays bass.

We are passionate about our music and over the next few years we hope to make a strong impact on the underground British Black Metal scene with further album releases and live performances. In addition to releasing and distributing the album, a key objective over the next 12 months is to secure gigs as support to some of the major Black Metal bands. Beyond that we hope to make inroads into the European and US markets, initially through on-line and possibly shop distribution, and eventually through tours.

We acknowledge a very wide range of musical influences including (in no particular order):

Nachtmystium, Xasthur, Krieg, Leviathan, Drougar, Uval, Judas Iskariot, Gorgoroth, Mayhem, Emperor, Enslaved, Type 0 Negative, Immortal, Burzum, Satyricon, Myrksgog, 1349, Merciful Fate, Windir, Vreid, Throne of Katharsis, Furze, Darkthrone, Tsjuder, Marduk, Dark Funeral, Enthroned, Crionics, Akercocke, Bal-Sagoth, Vesania, Behemoth, Abgott, Venom, Celtic Frost, Morbid Angel, Mortician, Dying Fetus, Possessed, Death, Criptopcy, Napalm Death, Cathedral, Orange Goblin, Reverend Bizarre, Sloth, Cannibal Corpse, Iron Maiden, AC/DC, Motorhead, Electric Wizard, Black Sabbath, Mott the Hoople, Sepultura, SunO, My Dying Bride, Paradise Lost, Insane Society, Slayer, Strapping Young Lad, Opeth, Led Zeppelin, Pink Fairies, In the Woods, Pink Floyd, I Shalt Become, Krom, Craft, Morrigon, Drukh, Horna, Gall Hammer, Cthonic, Nile, Black Witchery, Sodom.

I am now working on the RESERVOIR project.

Governance in this context is the act, fact, or manner (method) of governing; and the various means used to shape society to a desired end. When aid donors talk about 'good governance' they are referring to a number of factors, including: effective policy-making processes, sound economic policies, sound fiscal and financial management, effective and universal service delivery, well functioning democratic institutions, and low levels of corruption.

There is broad consensus in the donor community that one of the key obstacles to achieving the MDGs is poor governance; poverty reduction can not be achieved without a policy and institutional environment which facilitates growth. To most donors top of the list of indicators of poor governance is corruption.

However, the international community's agenda for governance reform has expanded over the years. For example the World Bank's list of recommendations for "good governance" for developing countries grew from 45 in 1997 to 116 in 2004.

Under the banner "Making Government Work for Poor People" the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) aims to "build political systems in developing countries that provide opportunities for all, including the poor, to organise and influence state policy and practice. This has wide implications such as ensuring equal access to information, enabling strong representation for all and establishing robust accountability structures". These may be laudable aims, but, in the context of the overall analysis of political motives, incentives and resultant political priorities, are they not rather overly ambitious and unachievable objectives, particularly give the very limited influence donors have over the development of political systems and policies in developing countries?

There is a growing body of thought that this agenda is completely unrealistic for poor countries with weak capacity. In particular it does not discriminate among:

• What is essential and what is not
• What should come first and what should follow
• What is feasible and what is not
• What can be achieved in the short-term vs. longer-term

But some academics point out that donor expectations of governance reform are a-historic. The political institutions in developed countries, on which the donors' "good governance" agenda is based, evolved over several hundred years - often involving a great deal of conflict and bloodshed. They evolved as a result of development, they were not the preconditions for development. History suggests that development can happen despite poor governance and that the full agenda as proposed by the donor agencies is not actually necessary. History also tells us that development can happen even with high levels of corruption - it depends on the type of corruption. For example corruption was endemic in British politics in the 18th and early 19th centuries, in the USA in the 19th century and in many Asian countries in recent times, yet these countries saw significant economic growth. They contend that capital accumulation, even by appropriation, is essential to long term development. The key question is what do the 'accumulators' do with their capital? Do they invest it oversees or spend it frivolously? Or do they invest in productive enterprises which benefit the economy? Therefore a much more sophisticated understanding of corruption, and a targeted and gradualist to governance reform approach is needed.

Not only is it is unrealistic to expect the pace and scope of governance reform demanded by donors, such reform efforts could be counterproductive in that they divert scare human resources away from other more important issues that might lead to growth.

There is therefore a growing belief that:

• Donors need to be realistic about the scope and pace of institutional reform in developing countries.
• They should focus on the essential reforms which are manageable for partner countries.
• They should focus on reforms which are particularly relevant to poverty reduction.
• Politics matters.

This is sometime referred to as the "good enough governance" approach.

Link to The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

• Ensure country office teams have adequate country knowledge and understanding of political economy
• Ensure teams have adequate analysis of the key sectors.
• Recognise that donor leverage is more limited than they think
• Tailor ambitions to the situation/context
• Focus on issues with political traction
• Adopt longer-term strategies with realistic time-frames
• Be flexible - as politics is unpredictable
• View crisis as an opportunity
• Consider greater use of complementary non-aid instruments

Link to Summary of Findings slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

What do DoC studies tell us about the "development context" and opportunities for poverty reduction in developing countries?

Do DoC studies offer any insights into the "development model" on which aid policies are based?

Do DoC studies provide any guidance on how aid can be made more effective?

They key findings are summarised under the headings:

Link to Key Findings of 'Drivers of Change' Studies slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

A study of the DoC and Power Analysis approach was carried out for the OECD DAC Development Assistance Committee) in 2005 by Danish and UK consultants. The report concluded that political economy analysis can contribute positively to improved aid effectiveness and relevance by highlighting the risks of alternative strategies and investments, and demonstrating how political considerations and a more incremental approach can improve implementation. But it also identified tensions between corporate objectives and pressures on donors to meet short term spending targets and to be accountable to their own taxpayers on the one hand, and the implications of Power and DOC analysis, which emphasise the prime importance of local political process and incremental change, on the other.

So aid COULD be more effective if donors are prepared to radically re-think their approach, in particular, to take a long-term perspective of change and to recognise the severe limitations of their influence on positive political and institutional development. they also need to be more aware of some of the negative effects of high levels of aid dependency - in particular fuelling corruption and strengthening corrupt elites.

Link to Can Aid Be Made More Effective? slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

Poverty reduction is a highly political issue.

Donor driven Poverty Reduction Strategies run counter to the prevailing incentive structures.

Donors are effectively pressing politicians to appeal and be accountable to voters on the basis of:

• Performance in service delivery and the prospect of future economic growth and prosperity

instead of:

• Identity, patronage and the delivery of direct personal benefits in the short term: which ensure their political survival.

Poverty reduction strategies raise voter expectations where state resources are limited and capacity to deliver is extremely weak.

The high risk of failure in meeting service delivery commitment means that there is a high political risk resulting in weak incentives for, and weak commitment to poverty reduction strategies.

The PRS approach by donors is likely to have little effect on policy-making and implementation.

Link to Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

DoC analysis suggests that:

?Patrimonialism? often dominates politics and is the norm where poor citizens (clients) exchange their political support for money, other direct benefits, or in repayment of obligations to their patron.

The reality of politics is that the formal democratic institutions are often ?captured? by informal networks of political and economic interests.

The real decisions are made in this ?private sphere? rather than in the formal ?public sphere? where donors tend to focus their major efforts.

It is important for donors to understand the informal private sphere, its influence on and relationship with the formal public sphere, and the degree to which incentives result in policies that fail to serve the needs of the poor.

But engaging in this private informal sphere presents major challenges for donors and might ultimately not be possible. Their influence on real policy making is therefore likely to remain very limited.

Link to Patrimonialism - Slide 8 slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

The latest mechanism for encouraging and supporting poverty reduction in developing countries has been the Poverty Reduction Strategy: a policy framework incorporating a broad range of measure the government commits itself to which are aimed at reducing poverty.

Donors do recognise that, to be effective, such a policy framework has to be politically 'owned'; it has to enjoy the full support of the key political actors. But experience shows that governments are adept at making the right noises and making commitments only to fail to deliver in the longer term. Very few PRSs have delivered on their promises and donors are left wondering why.

Link to Poverty Reduction Strategies slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

Decades of western aid have done little to ease suffering in many developing countries, particularly in Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa has long been the most aided major region of the developing world. Aid as a proportion of gross domestic product there has averaged over 5% for much of the past two decades, has reached nearly 10% at times and still equals nearly 6% of the region's GDP. These proportions are much higher in many smaller African countries.

But, despite this level of assistance, development performance in nearly all African countries has been deeply disappointing - indeed the overall picture is very grim.

Because of relatively low growth rates in most African countries over the past four decades, combined with high and rising population, average per capita incomes have fallen since 1970. Although average per capita income in the region increased modestly in 1995-7, it was still 15% lower in that period than it was in 1976-8. More than 300 million Africans live on less than a dollar day and two-thirds of the world's poorest countries are located in Africa. Every 12 hours the same number killed on 9/11 perish from AIDS in Africa, which has 2/3 of the world's cases. In a year 150,000 die giving birth, It is the only region of the world with regular savage wars, and the only continent that has grown steadily poorer over the last 30 years - between '70 and '00 Africa lost half its share of world markets to other developing nations. Over 50% of its population is under eighteen. Finally, making improvement even more difficult, at least 70,000 skilled graduates leave every year.

For many this begs serious questions about the delivery of aid and the prospects for poverty reduction.

Some observers, like Phyllis Pomerantz, argue that foreign aid as currently configured and presented is unnproductive, vain, and fruitless. Instrumental rationality has overtaken purposeful action and reform; reform that places people at the center of interaction and change. The failure of aid is not due to political economy or state sovereignty, selfishness, corruption, greed and/or arbitrary use of government power. It is culture that really matters. She makes a cultural case for why donors and governments need to begin to build greater levels of trust in order for aid to truly be effective. She calls for greater cultural sensitivity and dialogue between giving and receiving countries. If aid reform is to bring sustained development to Africa it can only be successful if aid agencies and other institutional entities change what they are currently doing.

Some observers take the view that aid is always a means of influence: political, commercial, military and security-related - however disguised or covert. Some influence is benign, but much of it is coercive, even imperialistic. They argue that, given the nature of aid, its effectiveness should be judged not only in developmental terms, but in terms of international relations. They assert that on both counts, the returns are meagre.

Others point to the protectionist practices of developed countries. E.g. to protect its farmers, the EU spends $350 billion/year with is 14 times the aid given to all of Africa and equal to its total annual income - thereby damaging its farmers and helping cause economic problems.

Kenyan economist James Shikwati takes the radical view that it is aid itself which has caused many of Africa's problems. The helpful intentions of donors have been damaging the continent for the past 40 years. If the industrial nations really want to help the Africans, he argues, they should terminate the aid. The countries that have collected the most development aid are the ones that are in the worst shape. Despite the billions that have poured in to Africa, the continent remains poor. Huge bureaucracies are financed with the aid money, corruption and complacency are promoted, Africans are taught to be beggars and not to be independent. In addition, development aid weakens the local markets everywhere and dampens the spirit of entrepreneurship that needed. If the West were to cancel these payments, normal Africans wouldn't even notice. Only the functionaries would be hard hit. Which is why they maintain that the world would stop turning without this development aid.

For their part donors are also beginning to ask themselves questions about aid effectiveness and to re-evaluate their programmes and approaches. But it would be asking too much of them to accept that aid isn't working at all.

Drivers of Change analysis came about in response to the debate about the overall effectiveness of aid and the "development model" (the set of assumptions about the way countries develop and the role of aid in that) which underpins donor agencies policies and strategies.

One key recognition is that politics is important - development will be much slower if the political environment is not conducive. Drivers of Change analysis is one of the tools DFID and other donors are using to become better aware of the political context of their programmes; to identify sectors in which there may be the political will for reform and those in which there is not.

Link to Aid Effectiveness? slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

Various Drivers of Change studies have been carried out involving in-depth, country level analysis in order to identify the opportunities, incentives and blockages to pro-poor change in a given country. Where possible studies are carried out either with the full support of, or jointly with, other donor agencies operating in-country. Ideally studies should be carried out with the knowledge and support of the government, but this can present problems if reports are critical of government.

The DoC methodology seeks to identify the political institutions, structures and agents, where they exist, that can act as key levers to enable what donors term pro-poor change and therefore improve the effectiveness of aid. The studies are carried out by teams of consultants engaged by DFID, who set out to answer a number of key questions about the political system, how political power is acquired and used, how political institutions function (for this reason some studies are called "Power Analysis"), how state resources are controlled and by whom, the extent and causes of corruption, the political priorities of the elite, the incentives governing political priorities, the extent to which poverty reduction currently features in those priorities and the opportunities for policies which support poverty reduction to be implemented.

In the first instance the studies involve reading the literature on the country's history and development and any other relevant background material. This is followed by visits to the country and interviews with key individuals including leading academics, DFID staff, staff of other donor agencies, non-governmental organisations and, where possible, people in or close to government.

Link to Methodology slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

"Political economy" is the set of power relationships, vested interests and incentives which underpin institutional functioning, political priorities and policy-making within a regime.

Donor agencies are primarily interested in the incentives that exist for powerful groups to care about poverty reduction and the poor and who will implement policies which will lead to widespread poverty reduction.

Link to Political Economy slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

International donor agencies providing aid to developing countries, such as the various national governmental agencies like DFID and USAID, and international agencies like the World Bank, UNDP etc., increasingly recognise that effective aid programmes must be grounded in an understanding of the economic, social and political factors that either drive or block change within a country. The Drivers of Change (DoC) approach emerged within DFID as a way of applying political economy analysis to the development of donor strategy. This is based on an implicit recognition that, despite significant amounts of aid provided over many years, poverty is still not reducing in most developing countries and, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, is getting worse.

All donor agencies are committed to helping developing countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - an internationally agreed set of aims including to reduce poverty by 50% by 2010 and to eliminate it by 2015. But progress has been far slower than expected and with every year that passes many countries, particularly in Africa, fall further behind on their targets and are extremely unlikely to meet them.

Link to Background to 'Drivers of Change' Analysis slide.

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

1. DRIVERS OF CHANGE - OR STAGNATION?
2. BACKGROUND TO 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' ANALYSIS
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
4. METHODOLOGY
5. AID EFFECTIVENESS?
6. KEY FINDINGS OF 'DRIVERS OF CHANGE' STUDIES
7. Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
8. The Politics of Survival
9. Patrimonialism
10. Political Incentives for Poverty Reduction
11. The Role of 'Good Governance' in Development
12. Can Aid Be Made More Effective?
13. Summary of Findings

Link to 'Drivers of Change - or Stagnation' SLIDE SHOW